Are Credit Unions Too Small?

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Abstract

U.S. credit unions serve 93 million members, hold 10 percent of U.S. savings deposits, and make 13.2 percent of all non-revolving consumer loans. Since 1985, the share of U.S. depository institution assets held by credit unions has nearly doubled, and the average (inflation-adjusted) size of credit unions has increased over 600 percent. We use a non-parametric local-linear estimator to estimate a cost relationship for credit unions and derive estimates of ray-scale and expansion-path scale economies. We employ a dimension-reduction technique to reduce estimation error, and bootstrap methods for inference. We find substantial evidence of increasing returns to scale across the range of sizes observed among credit unions, suggesting that further industry consolidation and growth in the average size of credit unions are likely.

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1 Introduction

Over the past three decades, advances in information-processing and communications technology (IT) and changes in regulation have had a profound impact on the environment in which commercial banks and other depository institutions operate. IT advances have enabled the development of new bank services (from automated teller machines to internet banking), financial instruments (such as various types of derivative securities), payments instruments (such as debit cards and automated clearinghouse payments), and credit evaluation and monitoring platforms.\(^1\) The same period saw the deregulation of deposit interest rates and branch banking, the imposition of risk-based capital requirements, and numerous other regulatory changes affecting depository institutions.\(^2\)

On balance, the recent changes in technology and regulation appear to have favored large institutions. The growth rates of larger banks, savings institutions and credit unions have typically exceeded those of their smaller competitors. For example, adjusted for inflation, the average U.S. commercial bank was 4.3 times larger in 2006 than the average U.S. bank in 1985.\(^3\) The average size of savings institutions and credit unions increased similarly.

Information technology has tended to favor larger institutions both because of the relatively high fixed cost of information processing equipment and software, and because these technologies have eroded some of the traditional benefits of small scale and close proximity to borrowers that enabled small lenders to out-compete larger institutions for some customers. For example, small business lending traditionally has been dominated by small, “community” banks, where close proximity and personal relationships have been important for obtaining information about the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. However, Petersen & Rajan (2002) argue that advances in IT have reduced the value of “soft” information in small business lending by making quantifiable information about potential borrowers more readily available, implying that close proximity between borrowers and lenders has become less important than in the past.

Like community banks, credit unions traditionally have operated at small scale and spe-

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1. See Berger (2003) for details and analysis of the effects of technological progress on productivity growth in the banking industry and on the structure of the banking industry.
3. In 1985, U.S. banks held an average of $189.5 million of assets. In 2006, banks held an average of $1,363 billion of assets ($815.5 million in constant 1985 dollars).
cialized in “relationship” lending. Credit unions are mutual organizations that provide deposit, lending, and other financial services to a membership defined by an occupational, fraternal or other bond. A common bond is advantageous because it can reduce the cost of assessing the creditworthiness of potential borrowers and thereby facilitate unsecured lending on reasonable terms to the credit union’s members. However, as with other lenders, recent advances in information processing and communications technology have lowered the cost of acquiring “hard” information about potential borrowers, and thereby have eroded some of the advantages of small scale and common bond that traditionally enabled credit unions to provide financial services at low cost to their memberships.4

Despite changes that seem to favor larger depository institutions, membership in credit unions—which traditionally have been much smaller in scale than other depository institutions—has continued to grow at a faster rate than U.S. population. As of October 2009, credit unions served 93 million members, up from 52 million in 1985 and 80 million in 2000. The share of total industry assets held by credit unions has also increased rapidly since the 1980s, from 3.3 percent in 1985 to 6.0 percent in 2005. Much of this gain came at the expense of savings and loan associations and savings banks, which saw a decline in share from 30.1 percent to 15.9 percent over the same period. By contrast, the share of industry assets held by commercial banks rose from 66.1 percent to 78.1 percent. Credit unions appear to have gained market share as a result of the recent financial crisis, however. For example, the share of home mortgages originated by credit unions rose from 3.6 percent in 2007 to 6.2 percent in 2008. Credit unions now hold some 10 percent of U.S. household savings deposits, 9 percent of all consumer loans, and 13.2 percent of non-revolving consumer loans. Credit unions are increasingly also a source of business loans, and legislation pending in Congress would permit credit unions to offer even more business loans by increasing the cap for such loans from 12.25 percent of a credit union’s total assets to 25 percent.5

Commercial banks oppose legislation to expand credit union powers, contending that credit

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4Walter (2006) notes that advances in information processing technology facilitated the emergence and expansion of national credit-reporting agencies in the 1970s, the increased use of credit cards, and the development of home-equity lines of credit. Further, Walter (2006) argues that the extension of federal deposit insurance to credit unions in the 1970s also reduced the benefits of a common bond by weakening the incentive for credit union depositors to monitor and discipline borrowers.

5H.R. 3380, the Promoting Lending to America’s Small Business Act was introduced in Congress during July 2009 by Representative Paul Kanjorski. Data on credit union membership, deposits and loans are available from the Credit Union National Association: http://www.cuna.org/.
unions benefit unfairly from favorable tax treatment and less regulation.

As with banks and savings institutions, large credit unions have experienced faster growth in total assets, membership and earnings than small credit unions (Goddard et al., 2002). Adjusted for inflation, the average credit union held 6.5 times more assets in 2006 than the average credit union in 1985. And, also like banks and savings institutions, the number of credit unions has declined sharply as the industry has consolidated. From a peak of 23,866 in 1969, the number of credit unions had fallen to just 8,662 in 2006. The Credit Union Membership Access Act of 1998 facilitated this consolidation by affirming the right of credit unions to accept members from unrelated groups. The number of credit unions characterized by multiple common bonds has since increased rapidly.

The rapid consolidation and increasing average scale of credit unions have implications for U.S. banking market structure and for assessing competition in banking markets. Some research finds that agency problems are greater at larger credit unions, suggesting that credit union members may be harmed by continued growth in the average size of credit unions (e.g., Leggett & Strand, 2002). However, several studies have noted an inverse relationship between average operating expenses and credit union size (e.g., Emmons & Schmid, 1999a; Leggett & Strand, 2002; and Wilcox, 2005), and Wilcox (2006) finds that the cost advantage of large credit unions has been increasing over time. Further, Goddard et al. (2008) find that larger credit unions have more opportunities for diversification into non-traditional product lines, such as business loans, credit cards and mutual funds and that doing so has reduced

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6U.S. credit unions held an average of $84.6 million in assets in 2006 ($50.6 million in constant 1985 dollars) versus $7.8 million in 1985.

7As the advantages of a common bond were eroded, credit unions began to press for authority to expand their membership base. In 1982, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the regulator of federal credit unions, ruled that a single credit union could serve employees of multiple employers even when not all employers were engaged in the same industrial activity. Commercial banks challenged the NCUA ruling and in 1998 the Supreme Court ruled that the NCUA’s interpretation was in violation of the Federal Credit Union Act, which limited membership in federally-chartered credit unions to groups having a common bond of occupation or other association. Congress responded by enacting the Credit Union Membership Access Act of 1998. See Walter (2006) for more about the early history and regulation of credit unions in the United States.

8See Gilbert & Zaretsky (2003) for a discussion of competitive analysis and anti-trust policy as applied to commercial banks, including the use of information about credit unions in assessing competition in banking markets. See Fried et al. (1999) and Goddard et al. (2007) for evidence on the determinants and effects of credit union mergers.

9Other papers investigating agency problems in credit unions include Emmons & Schmid (1999b) and Frame et al. (2003).
the volatility of their earnings while providing their members with additional services.

This paper presents estimates of returns to scale for U.S. credit unions. We evaluate returns to scale in the context of a model of credit union cost, and unlike prior studies of credit unions, investigate whether scale economies have expanded over time in line with the industry’s consolidation and the increasing average size of credit unions.\textsuperscript{10} Our data consist of more than 180,000 annual observations for 1989–2006 on all retail credit unions (except those with missing or implausible data).\textsuperscript{11} We use a non-parametric, local-linear estimator to estimate our model, from which we derive estimates of returns to scale.\textsuperscript{12} We augment the local-linear estimator with two additional kernel functions to (i) handle discrete dummy variables that indicate whether particular credit unions make commercial or real estate loans, and (ii) to incorporate a discrete time variable. Our augmentation is similar to that of Racine & Li (2004), who use a Nadarya-Watson-type kernel estimator to smooth continuous covariates. However, the local linear estimator we use to smooth along continuous dimensions has (asymptotically) less bias, with no more variance, than the Nadarya-Watson estimator.\textsuperscript{13}

We employ three different bandwidth parameters in our estimation—one for the continuous covariates (after pre-whitening and using a dimension reduction technique to mitigate the effects of the well-known curse of dimensionality), another for the two binary dummy variables, and a third for the discrete time variable. In addition, we use a bias-corrected bootstrap for inference. Only recently has bootstrapping and optimization of three bandwidths with more than 180,000 observations using least-squares cross validation become computationally feasible at low cost.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{10}Wheelock & Wilson (2001) report evidence of an increase in the minimum efficient scale of commercial banks between 1985 and 1994, whereas Wheelock & Wilson (1999) and Wheelock & Wilson (2009) find that on average, large banks have experienced larger increases in productivity over the past 20 years than small banks.

\textsuperscript{11}Specifically, we omitted observations for which negative values of loans, interest rates, or factor prices were reported, or for which all loans were zero. We also do not include data on corporate credit unions, which are organizations that provide payments and other services to retail credit unions.

\textsuperscript{12}Many studies derive estimates of scale economies by fitting a translog cost function across all firms in an industry. However, the translog function has been found to mis-specify many cost relationships, especially when firms are of widely varying sizes. In the appendix to this paper, we report results showing that the translog function also mis-specifies cost relationships for U.S. credit unions.

\textsuperscript{13}Regarding the direction of the bias, our estimator will tend to under- (over-) estimate the conditional mean function in regions where it exhibits sharp peaks (valleys). See Fan & Gijbels (1996) for details.

\textsuperscript{14}We use a high-throughput Condor pool operated by Clemson University for our computations. Condor systems are a form of grid computing, and consist of a scheduler that sends jobs to machines in the pool when they are idle, thereby harvesting (or scavenging; hence the name “Condor”) otherwise unused
We estimate both ray scale economies and expansion-path scale economies. Our estimates of ray scale economies indicate rapidly increasing returns to scale for credit unions below the median size, but near constant returns for larger credit unions. However, our estimates of expansion-path scale economies, which may better reflect scale economies near the combinations of inputs and outputs in actual credit union production, indicate that even the largest credit unions operate under increasing returns to scale. Thus, despite substantial industry consolidation and increase in average credit union size during the past two decades, the evidence suggests that more consolidation and increase in average size is likely, especially if legal restrictions on credit union membership or activities are eased further.

The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we describe a model of credit union costs. Section 3 presents details of our estimation strategy. Results are presented in Section 4, and our conclusions are discussed in Section 5.

2 A Model of Credit Union Costs

2.1 The Baseline Model

To estimate scale economies, we must first specify a model of credit union costs. Credit unions use a number of inputs to produce a wide range of services; in studies of credit union performance, limited data and, in the case of non-parametric approaches, limits on the number of dimensions that can reasonably be examined, force researchers to employ simplified models.

Following Frame et al. (2003) and Frame & Coelli (2001), we model credit unions as service providers that seek to minimize non-interest costs subject to the prices of labor and capital inputs, the prevailing production technology, and the level and types of output they produce.\(^{15}\) For the baseline model, we specify four variable output quantities: real estate loans \((Y_1)\), commercial loans \((Y_2)\), consumer loans \((Y_3)\), and investments \((Y_4)\). Further, we need no communication between tasks until the very end. Additional details on the development of Condor systems are available at http://condor.cecs.umn.edu/; details on the Condor system operated by Clemson University are available at http://www.cs.clemson.edu/condor/.

\(^{15}\)See also Bauer (2008), Fried et al. (1993), Fried et al. (1999) and Smith (1984).
following Frame et al. (2003), we treat the average interest rates on deposits \((Y_5)\) and loans \((Y_6)\) as additional, quasi-fixed outputs to capture the price dimension of service to credit union members. Also like Frame et al. (2003), our model includes the price of capital \((W_1)\) and the price of labor \((W_2)\) faced by each credit union. Finally, our model includes a discrete time variable \((T)\) for each year in our data, and two dummy variables, \(D_1\) and \(D_2\), that identify individual credit unions that make real estate or commercial loans, with

\[
D_1 = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } Y_1 > 0; \\
0 & \text{otherwise}, 
\end{cases} \tag{2.1}
\]

and

\[
D_2 = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } Y_2 > 0; \\
0 & \text{otherwise.} 
\end{cases} \tag{2.2}
\]

Table 1 lists the variables in our model and how each is defined in terms of call report items.\(^\text{16}\)

Table 2 reports summary statistics for the variables in our model, as well as for total operating cost (expenditures on physical capital and labor inputs) and total assets. The mean values reported for \(D_1\) and \(D_2\) in Table 2 indicate that over 1989–2006, about 63 percent of credit unions made real estate loans, whereas only about 14 percent made commercial loans. Our data consist of 184,279 annual (year-end) observations for all state- and federally-chartered retail credit unions during 1989–2006; numbers of observations for each of 18 years are given in Table 3.\(^\text{17}\)

Figure 1 shows kernel density estimates for (inflation-adjusted) credit union total assets for 1989, 1997, and 2006. The densities for each year are skewed to the right (note the use of a log scale on the figure’s horizontal axis). The density estimates also reveal that the distribution of credit union sizes has shifted to the right, reflecting the increase in average (and median) credit union size over time.

The variables defined above and listed in Table 1 suggest a mapping

\[
(Y_1, \ldots, Y_6, W_1, W_2, T) \rightarrow C. \tag{2.3}
\]

\(^\text{16}\)Call report data for individual credit unions are available from the National Credit Union Administration (www.ncua.gov). We obtained our data from the Federal Reserve.

\(^\text{17}\)We omitted observations where either \(Y_1 < 0\), \(Y_2 < 0\), \(Y_3 < 0\), \(Y_4 < 0\), \((Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3) = 0\), \(Y_5 \notin (0, 1)\), \(Y_6 \notin (0, 1)\), \(W_1 \notin (0, 1)\), or \(W_2 \leq 0\). These observations reflected obviously incorrect values for one or more variables—usually one or both of the price variables—or zero values for all loans.
For estimation, we impose homogeneity of the cost function with respect to input prices by dividing both $C$ and $W_1$ by $W_2$. In addition, because large numbers of observations on $Y_2$ and $Y_3$ are equal to zero (as shown in the summary statistics in Table 2), we combine these outputs with $Y_1$ by using the sum $(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3)$ and the dummy variables $D_1$ and $D_2$ in our estimation. Then the mapping in (2.3) suggests a regression function

$\left(\frac{C}{W_2}\right) = C(y_1, w_1) + \varepsilon,$  \hspace{1cm} (2.4)

where $y_1 = [(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3) Y_4]$, $w_1 = [Y_5 \ Y_6 \ W_1/W_2 \ T \ D_1 \ D_2]$, and $\varepsilon$ is a random error term with $E(\varepsilon) = 0$. Given that the expectation of $\varepsilon$ equals 0, $C(y_1, w_1) = E(C/W_2 \mid y_1, w_1)$ is a conditional mean function that can be estimated by various regression techniques.

### 2.2 Alternative Models

The regression function in (2.4) serves as a baseline model, which we refer to as “Model 1.” Conceivably, there are determinants of a credit union’s variable costs besides those included in (2.3). In particular, management quality and the effectiveness of a credit union’s accounting infrastructure or IT services would likely affect its ability to operate at lower cost. One might expect that larger credit unions would have better access to high-quality management and IT services, but some large credit unions might be poorly managed. In addition, smaller credit unions with savvy managers might be able to out-source some of their IT services to efficient providers. In an attempt to capture these factors, we also estimate a second model that includes an instrumental variable $M$, consisting of estimates of technical efficiency.\footnote{Wheelock & Wilson (1995, 2000) use estimates of technical efficiency as proxies for management quality in competing risks models of time to failure and time to acquisition for commercial banks.}

To estimate technical efficiency, first consider the production set implied by (2.3), namely

$\mathcal{P} = \{(u, v) \mid u \text{ can produce } v\},$  \hspace{1cm} (2.5)

where $u \in \mathbb{R}_+^p$ is a vector of $p$ input quantities and $v \in \mathbb{R}_+^q$ is a vector of $q$ output quantities. Here, $p = 2$ and $q = 6$. The input vector $u$ includes capital ($X_1$) and labor ($X_2$) corresponding to the prices $W_1$ and $W_2$ defined above. The output vector $v$ contains variables $Y_1, \ldots, Y_6$. Assuming the distribution of input and output vectors has bounded support
over the production set $\mathcal{P}$, the directional distance function defined by

$$D(u, v \mid d_u, d_v) = \sup \{ \beta \mid (u - \beta d_u, y + \beta d_v) \in \mathcal{P} \} \geq 0,$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.6)

where $d_u \in \mathbb{R}^p_+$ and $d_v \in \mathbb{R}^q_+$ are pre-defined direction vectors, provides a (directional) measure of technical efficiency. A firm operating at a point $(u, v)$ in the interior of $\mathcal{P}$ is technically inefficient; in principal, it could become technically efficient by moving to the boundary of $\mathcal{P}$ along the path $(u - \beta d_u, v + \beta d_v), \beta > 0$. A technically inefficient firm operating at $(u, v) \in \mathcal{P}$ lying strictly below the upper boundary of $\mathcal{P}$ is dominated by any firm operating at $(\tilde{u}, \tilde{v}) \in \mathcal{P}$ where $\tilde{u} \leq u$ and $\tilde{v} \leq v$. Firms lying in the interior of $\mathcal{P}$ do not perform optimally the task of converting inputs into outputs; i.e., they are technically inefficient. In the case of credit unions, firms may be inefficient due to managerial mistakes, poor IT operations, adverse labor market conditions, etc.

Given a sample $\{(u_i, v_i)\}_{i=1}^n$ of observed input-output vectors, an estimate of the directional distance function defined in (2.6) for firm $i$ can be computed by solving

$$\hat{D}(u_i, v_i \mid d_{u,i}, d_{v,i}) = \max_{\beta, q} \{ \beta \mid V_q - \beta d_{v,i} \geq v_i, U q + \beta d_{u,i} \leq u_i, i'_n q = 1, q \geq 0 \},$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.7)

where the direction vectors $d_{u,i}$ and $d_{v,i}$ corresponding to firm $i$ are given a priori, $q$ is an $(n \times 1)$ vector of weights, $i_n$ is an $(n \times 1)$ vector of ones, $U = [u_1 \ldots u_n]$ is a $(p \times n)$ matrix of input vectors, $V = [v_1 \ldots v_n]$ is a $(q \times n)$ matrix of output vectors, and $\beta$ is a scalar. Solutions to (2.7) can be computed using linear programming methods; we use a revised simplex method described by Hadley (1962).\footnote{Directional distance functions have been discussed in the context of microeconomic theory by Chambers et al. (1996, 1998) and Färe & Grosskopf (2000). When $d_u = 0$ and $d_v = v$, $D(u, v \mid d_u, d_v) = \frac{1}{\lambda(u, v)} - 1$ where $\lambda(u, v)$ is the Shephard (1970) output distance function; when $d_u = u$ and $d_v = 0$, $D(u, v \mid d_u, d_v) = 1 - \frac{1}{\beta(u, v)}$ where $\beta(u, v)$ is the Shephard (1970) input distance function. Consistency and rates of convergence of the estimator appearing in (2.7) have been proved by Kneip et al. (2008) for these special cases. Wilson (2009) establishes similar properties for a hyperbolic estimator similar to (2.7) where efficiency is measured along a hyperbola passing through the point of interest. Intuition suggests that similar properties extend to the estimator in (2.7), but a formal proof is beyond the scope of this paper.}

Our instrumental variable $M$ is constructed by computing estimates $\hat{D}(u_i, v_i \mid d_{u,i}, d_{v,i})$ for each credit union $i = 1, \ldots, n_t$ in year $t$. For each credit union $i$, we set $d_{u,i} = u_i$; the first four elements of $d_{v,i}$ are set equal to the first four elements of $v_i$ (corresponding to the variables $Y_1, \ldots, Y_4$), while the last two elements of $d_{v,i}$ (corresponding to $Y_5$ and $Y_6$) are
set to zero. Hence we estimate technical efficiency for each firm while holding the service outputs $Y_5$ and $Y_6$ constant at their observed values, and while maintaining observed input-output vectors for a given year $t$. Our second model, “Model 2,” is obtained by replacing $y_1$ and $w_1$ in (2.4) with $y_2 = y_1$ and $w_2 = [Y_5\ Y_6\ W_1/W_2\ M\ T\ D_1\ D_2]$.

In both Models 1 and 2, it is conceivable that loans and investments are endogenous with respect to costs. It is clear that costs are incurred by making loans and investments, but credit unions facing high (marginal) costs might also be reluctant to make additional loans or investments. Consequently, we also specify Models 3 and 4 by replacing the loan and investment variables $Y_1$, $Y_2$, $Y_3$, and $Y_4$ (as well as the dummy variables $D_1$ and $D_2$) in Models 1 and 2 with one-period lags. The lagged variables then serve as instruments for the loan and investment variables in Models 1 and 2.

### 2.3 Measuring Returns to Scale

In each Model $j$, $j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$, the right-hand side variables have been partitioned into an array $y_j$ of variable outputs and an array $w_j$ of quasi-fixed outputs, input prices, and other variables. For each model we wish to examine returns to scale as the outputs in $y_j$ are increased while holding fixed the variables in $w_j$.

For a particular Model $j$, consider a specific point $(y_0, w_0)$ in the space of $(y, w)$, omitting subscripts $j$ to streamline the notation. In our empirical analysis in Section 4, we define $(y_0, w_0)$ by the medians of the variables in $y$ and $w$ in specific years. The set of points $R_0 = \{(\theta y_0, w_0) \mid \theta \in (0, \infty)\}$ comprises a ray along which the variable outputs in $y$ are produced in constant proportion to each other. Ray scale economies can be evaluated by examining how expected cost varies along this ray, providing insight into returns to scale along the ray $R_0$. Returns to scale are frequently measured in terms of elasticities; the elasticity of cost (with respect to $y$) at a particular point $(y, w)$ along the ray $R_0$ is given by

$$
\eta(y, w) \equiv \left. \frac{\partial \log C(\theta y, w)}{\partial \log \theta} \right|_{\theta=1} = \sum_{\ell} \frac{\partial \log C(y, w)}{\partial \log y_{\ell}},
$$

where $\ell$ indexes the elements of $y$. The elasticity in (2.8) is the multi-product analog of marginal cost divided by average cost on the ray $R_0$, with $\eta(y, w)(<, =, >)$ implying
(increasing, constant, decreasing) returns to scale as outputs in \( y \) are expanded along the ray \( R_0 \). Credit unions for which \( \eta(y, w) \neq 1 \) are not competitively viable; if credit unions were subject to the normal rules of competitive behavior, either a smaller or a larger credit union could drive a credit union with \( \eta(y, w) \neq 1 \) from a competitive market.

The measure defined in (2.8) requires estimation of derivatives of the cost function. We employ fully non-parametric estimation methods, as discussed below in Section 3. Because non-parametric estimates of derivatives of a function are typically noisier than estimates of the function itself:\(^{20}\) we define the ratio

\[
S(\theta | y_0, w_0) \equiv \frac{C(\theta y_0, w_0)}{\theta C(y_0, w_0)}.
\]

(2.9)

It is straightforward to show that

\[
\frac{\partial S(\theta | y_0, w_0)}{\partial \theta} \leq 0 \iff \eta(y_0, w_0) \leq 1;
\]

(2.10)

i.e., \( S(\theta | y_0, w_0) \) is decreasing (constant, increasing) in \( \theta \) if returns to scale are increasing (constant, decreasing) at \((\theta y_0, w_0)\) along the ray \( R_0 \) passing through \((y_0, w_0)\). In addition, \( S(1 | y_0, w_0) = 1 \) by definition. Thus, ray scale economies (RSE) along a ray \( R_0 \) can be examined by estimating \( C(y_0, w_0) \) and \( C(\theta y_0, w_0) \) for various values of \( \theta \), and using confidence bands to determine whether \( S(\theta | y_0, w_0) \) is downward or upward sloping.

Of course, not all credit unions are located along the ray \( R_0 \); in fact, it is conceivable that none are located along \( R_0 \). RSE is a convenient measure of scale economies, but may be misleading if most credit unions are located “far” from \( R_0 \). As an alternative to RSE, we also consider scale economies along each credit union’s expansion path, holding the mix of outputs in \( y \) constant for each credit union. Consider the \( i \)th credit union operating at the point \((y_i, w_i)\), with cost \( C(y_i, w_i) \). Let \( \gamma \) be a small positive number, say 0.05 and consider how cost changes as we move from \(((1 - \gamma)y_i, w_i)\) to \(((1 + \gamma)y_i, w_i)\); along this path, the output mix remains constant in the sense that relative proportions are maintained. Now let \( \theta(1 - \gamma)y_i = (1 + \gamma)y_i \); then \( \theta = (1 + \gamma)/(1 - \gamma) \).

Expansion-path scale economies (EPSE) for the \( i \)th credit union operating at \((y_i, w_i)\)
are measured by

\[
\mathcal{E}_i = \frac{C \left( \theta (1 - \gamma) y_i, w_i \right)}{\theta C \left( (1 - \gamma) y_i, w_i \right)} = \frac{C \left( (1 + \gamma) y_i, w_i \right)}{(1 + \gamma \theta) C \left( (1 - \gamma) y_i, w_i \right)}.
\]

(2.11)

A credit union operating at \((y_i, w_i)\) experiences (decreasing, constant, increasing) returns to scale along the path from \(((1 - \gamma) y_i, w_i)\) to \(((1 + \gamma) y_i, w_i)\) as \(\mathcal{E}_i(>, =, <)1\). Our measure \(\mathcal{E}_i\) gives an indication of returns to scale faced by the \(i\)th credit union along the path from the origin through the credit union’s observed output vector, starting at a level equal to \((1 - \gamma)\)-percent of the quantities in \(y_i\) and continuing to a level equal to \((1 + \gamma)\)-percent of the quantities in \(y_i\).

Figure 2 illustrates the differences between our RSE and EPSE measures. In Figure 2, five hypothetical credit unions, each producing two outputs and with other variables constant, are represented by the points labeled \(A\) through \(E\). The median output vector is represented by an open circle along the dashed ray (labeled \(\Re_0\)) from the origin. The RSE measure defined in (2.9) measures returns to scale along the length of this ray as \(\theta\) varies. The EPSE measure defined in (2.11), by contrast, measures returns to scale along each firm’s expansion path, represented by the dotted rays from the origin through the points \(A–E\). Moreover, by construction, EPSE measures returns to scale in the neighborhood of a given credit union’s actual production, which is represented by the solid portion of the rays from the origin. As the example illustrates, some firms may operate far from any point along the ray \(\Re_0\). Hence, EPSE may represent more accurately returns to scale faced by actual credit unions.

Both our RSE and EPSE measures are defined in terms of a credit union’s cost function. In the next section, we discuss a strategy for estimating the cost function non-parametrically, which in turn allows us to estimate, and make inference about, our measures of scale economies.

### 3 Estimation Strategy

#### 3.1 Parametric versus Non-Parametric Estimation

Various approaches exist for estimating regression functions (i.e., conditional mean functions) such as the one defined above in (2.4). In parametric approaches, a translog specification is
often used for the conditional mean function. It is important to note, however, that because the translog cost function is merely a quadratic specification in log-space, the variety of shapes the cost function is permitted to take is limited. Further, because the translog is derived from a Taylor expansion of the cost function around the mean of the data, it makes little sense to use the translog specification to attempt inference about returns to scale over units of widely varying size. We find that the translog specification is easily rejected by our data; see the Appendix for details.

Rejection of the translog functional form is hardly surprising. Several studies have noted that the parameters of a translog function are unlikely to be stable when the function is fit globally across units of widely varying sizes. The problem points to the use of non-parametric estimation methods. Although non-parametric methods are less efficient in a statistical sense than parametric methods when the true functional form is known, non-parametric estimation avoids the risk of specification error when the true functional form is unknown, which, to our knowledge, is the case here.

We use a fully non-parametric, local-linear estimator augmented to handle discrete co-variates. Non-parametric regression models may be viewed as infinitely parameterized; as such, any parametric regression model (such as the translog cost function) is nested within a non-parametric regression model. Clearly, adding more parameters to a parametric model affords greater flexibility. Non-parametric regression models represent the limiting outcome of adding additional parameters.

3.2 Dimension Reduction

Most non-parametric regression methods suffer from the well-known curse of dimensionality, a phenomenon that causes rates of convergence to become slower, and estimation error to

---

21 See, for example, Guilkey et al. (1983) and Chalfant & Gallant (1985) for Monte Carlo evidence, and Cooper & McLaren (1996) and Banks et al. (1997) for empirical evidence involving consumer demand. Still others have found a similar problem while estimating cost functions for hospitals (Wilson & Carey, 2004) and for U.S. commercial banks (e.g., McAllister & McManus, 1993; Mitchell & Onvural, 1996; and Wheelock & Wilson, 2001); both hospitals and banks vary widely in terms of size, as do credit unions.

22 Härdle & Mammen (1993) describe a procedure for testing a parametric regression specification against a non-parametric alternative; one could think of this as a very general specification test, as opposed to the specific specification tests described in the preceding paragraph. In this paper, however, it is trivial to reject the translog specification using the tests described in the Appendix.

23 See Fan & Gijbels (1996, chapter 1) and Härdle & Linton (1999) for nice descriptions of non-parametric regression and the surrounding issues. Several possibilities for non-parametric regression exist.
increase dramatically, as the number of continuous right-hand side variables increases (the presence of discrete dummy variables does not affect the rate of convergence of our estimator). To help mitigate this problem, we use a dimension-reduction technique based on principal components. The idea is to trade a relatively small amount of information in the data for a reduction in dimensionality that will have a large (and favorable) impact on estimation error.

Let $J_j$ denote the sum of the number of continuous variables on the right-hand side of Model $j$, excluding the ordered categorical variable $T$ and the binary variables $D_1$ and $D_2$. Then $J_j = 5$ for $j \in \{1, 3\}$ and $J_j = 6$ for $j \in \{2, 4\}$.

For an $(n \times 1)$ vector $U$ define the function

$$\psi_1(U) \equiv (U - n^{-1}i'U) \left[ n^{-1}U'U - n^{-2}i'i'U \right]^{-1/2}$$

where $i$ denotes an $(n \times 1)$ vector of 1’s. The function $\psi_1(\cdot)$ standardizes a variable by subtracting its sample mean and then dividing by its sample standard deviation. Next, let $A_j$ be an $(n \times J_j)$ matrix; for Model 1, the columns of $A_1$ contain $\psi_1(\log(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3))$, $\psi_1(\log(1+Y_4))$, $\psi_1(Y_5)$, $\psi_1(Y_6)$, and $\psi_1\left(\log\left(\frac{W_1}{W_2}\right)\right)$. The first five columns of $A_2$ are identical to the columns of $A_1$, and the sixth column of $A_2$ contains $\psi_1(M)$. For Models 3 and 4, $A_3$ and $A_4$ are similar to $A_1$ and $A_2$, but with lagged variables replacing $Y_1$, $Y_2$, $Y_3$, $Y_4$, $D_1$, and $D_2$ (respectively). In each model, the three loan variables $Y_1$, $Y_2$, and $Y_3$ (or their lagged values) are summed since, as noted previously in Section 2, many credit unions make neither real estate nor commercial loans. The dummy variables $D_1$ and $D_2$ (or their lags in Models 3–4) retain some information that would otherwise be lost by identifying those credit unions that are observed to hold either real estate or commercial loans.

Let $\Lambda_j$ be the $(J_j \times J_j)$ matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of the $(J_j \times J_j)$ correlation matrix whose elements are the Pearson correlation coefficients for pairs of columns of $A_j$. Let $\lambda_{jk}$ be the eigenvalue corresponding to the $k$th eigenvector in the $k$th column of $\Lambda_j$, where the columns of $\Lambda_j$ for a particular model $j$, and hence the corresponding eigenvalues, have been sorted so that $\lambda_{j1} \geq \ldots \geq \lambda_{j5}$. Then set $P_j = A_j \Lambda_j$. The matrix $P_j$ has dimensions $(n \times J_j)$, and its columns are the principal components of $A_j$. Principal component vectors are orthogonal, and for each $k \in \{1, 2, \ldots, J_j\}$, the quantity

$$\phi_{jk} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{k} \lambda_j}{\sum_{\ell=1}^{J_j} \lambda_{\ell}}$$

(3.2)
represents the proportion of the independent linear information in $A_j$ that is contained in the first $k$ principal components, i.e., the columns of $P_j$ for each $j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$.

Using our data, we find for Model 1 $\phi_{1k} = 0.5012, 0.7665, 0.8986, 0.9757, \text{ and } 1.0$ for $k = 1, \ldots, 5$ respectively. For Model 2, $\phi_{2k} = 0.4256, 0.6641, 0.8082, 0.9174, 0.9798, \text{ and } 1.0$ for $k = 1, \ldots, 6$; for Model 3, $\phi_{3k} = 0.4982, 0.7618, 0.8979, 0.9740, \text{ and } 1.0$ for $k = 1, \ldots, 5$; and for Model 4, $\phi_{4k} = 0.4244, 0.6669, 0.8044, 0.9170, 0.9785, \text{ and } 1.0$ for $k = 1, \ldots, 6$. Consequently, in our non-parametric estimation of the credit union cost function in each model, we use the first four principal components, omitting the last one in Models 1 and 3, and omitting the last two in Models 2 and 4. In doing so, we sacrifice a relatively small amount of information—2.43, 8.26, 2.60, and 8.30 percent of the independent linear information in the samples for Models 1–4, respectively—in order to reduce the dimensionality of our estimation problem by one dimension in the space of the continuous covariates. Given the curse of dimensionality, this seems a good trade-off.\footnote{The convergence rate of our local linear estimator is $n^{1/(4+\ell)}$, where $\ell$ is the number of continuous right-hand side variables. With $n = 184,279$ observations and $\ell = 4$ continuous right-hand side variables, we achieve an order of estimation error that would require 3,817,301 observations with six continuous right-hand-side variables, and 17,375,290 observations with seven continuous right-hand-side variables.}

### 3.3 Estimating Returns to Scale

Because we use the first four columns of $P_j$ for each Model $j$, in the remainder of this section we suppress the $j$-subscript denoting a particular model; the following discussion applies to each of our four models if the reader remembers to substitute lagged variables for $D_1$ and $D_2$ in the cases of Models 3 and 4.

Let $P_k$ denote the $k$th column of the principal component matrix $P$ and define

$$
\psi_0(P_k) \equiv P_k \left[ n^{-1} P_k' P_k - n^{-2} P_k' i i' P_k \right]^{-1/2}.
$$

The transformation $\psi_0(P_k)$ has (constant) unit variance. Next, let $z_i$ represent the row vector containing the $i$th observations on $\psi_0(P_1)$, $\psi_0(P_2)$, $\psi_0(P_3)$, and $\psi_0(P_4)$. We can now write our model as the following regression equation:

$$
C_i = m(z_i, T_i, D_{i1}, D_{i2}) + \varepsilon_i
$$

where the subscript $i$ indexes observations, $C_i = \psi_1 \left( \log \left( \frac{C_i}{W_i} \right) \right)$, $\varepsilon_i$ is a random error term with $E(\varepsilon_i) = 0$, $\text{VAR}(\varepsilon_i) = \sigma^2(z_i)$, $T_i$ represents the $i$th observation on the time
variable, and $D_{i1}$, and $D_{i2}$ represent the $i$th observations on $D_1$ and $D_2$. The function $m(z_i, T_i, D_{i1}, D_{i2}) = E(C_i \mid z_i, T_i, D_{i1}, D_{i2})$ is a conditional mean function, and can be estimated by non-parametric methods. Moreover, since the transformation from $(C/W_2)$ to $C$ can be inverted, given an estimated value $\hat{m}(z, T, D_{1}, D_{2})$, straightforward algebra leads to an estimate

$$\hat{C}(y, w) = \exp \left[ \psi_1^{-1} (\hat{m}(z, T, D_{1}, D_{2})) \right].$$  \hfill (3.5)

To estimate returns to scale for credit unions, we need merely estimate the measure $S(\theta \mid y_0, w_0)$ defined earlier by replacing $C(y_0, w_0)$ and $C(\theta y_0, w_0)$ on the right-hand side of (2.9) with estimates $\hat{C}(y_0, w_0)$ and $\hat{C}(\theta y_0, w_0)$ obtained from (3.5).

In order to estimate the conditional mean function in (3.4), suppose (for the moment) that the time variable $T$ and the binary dummy variables $D_1$, $D_2$ do not influence the value of the conditional mean function $m(z, T, D_{1}, D_{2})$, so that we can write the conditional mean function on the right-hand side of (3.4) as $m(z)$. Both the Nadarya-Watson (Nadarya, 1964; Watson, 1964) kernel estimator and the local linear estimator are special cases of local polynomial estimators; with the local linear estimator, the local polynomial is of order 1, while with the Nadarya-Watson estimator the local polynomial is of order 0. The local linear estimator has less asymptotic bias, but the same asymptotic variance, as the Nadarya-Watson estimator.

To illustrate the local-linear estimator, momentarily ignore the discrete covariates in (3.4) and write the conditional mean function as $m_*(z)$. The local linear estimator follows from a first-order Taylor expansion of $m_*(z)$ in a neighborhood of an arbitrary point $z_0$:

$$m_*(z) \approx m_*(z_0) + \frac{\partial m_*(z_0)}{\partial z} (z - z_0).$$  \hfill (3.6)

This suggests estimating the conditional mean function at $z_0$ by solving the locally weighted least squares regression problem

$$\begin{bmatrix} \hat{\alpha}_0 \\ \hat{\alpha} \end{bmatrix} = \arg\min_{\alpha_0, \alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ C_i - \alpha_0 - (z_i - z_0)\alpha \right]^2 K \left( |H|^{-1} (z_i - z_0) \right)$$ \hfill (3.7)

where $K(\cdot)$ is a piece-wise continuous multivariate kernel function satisfying $\int \cdots \int_{\mathbb{R}^{\ell}} K(\mathbf{u}) \, d\mathbf{u} = 1$ and $K(\mathbf{u}) = K(-\mathbf{u})$, $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{R}^{\ell}$; $H$ is an $\ell \times \ell$ matrix of bandwidths; $\alpha_0$ is a scalar, and $\alpha$ is an $\ell$-vector.
The solution to the least squares problem in (3.7) is

$$[\hat{\alpha}_0 \quad \hat{\alpha}']' = (Z' \Phi Z)^{-1} Z' \Phi C,$$

(3.8)

where $C = [C_1 \ldots C_n]'$, $\Phi = \text{diag}[K(|H|^{-1}(z_i - z_0))]$, and $Z$ is an $n \times (\ell + 1)$ matrix with $i$th row given by $[1 \ (z_i - z_0)]$. The fitted value $\hat{\alpha}_0$ provides an estimate $\hat{m}_*(z_0)$ of the conditional mean function $m_*(z_0)$ at an arbitrary point $z_0$.\(^{25}\)

### 3.4 Estimation with Discrete Covariates

Introduction of the binary dummy variables $D_{i1}$ and $D_{i2}$ into the analysis requires some modification. One possibility is to split the sample into four subsamples according to the values of the discrete variables, and then estimate the model on each group separately while treating time as a continuous variable. However, in our application, some of these subsamples would be very small since only about 63 percent of credit unions make real estate loans and only about 14 percent make commercial loans. Moreover, this approach would not make efficient use of the data to the extent that each subsample contains some information that would be useful in estimation on the other subsamples.

Alternatively, we can accommodate discrete variables by modifying the weighting matrix $\Phi$ introduced in (3.8). The idea involves smoothing across time periods as well as over the four categories defined by the two binary dummy variables, and letting the data determine how much smoothing is appropriate.\(^{26}\) Let $u_i$ represent a vector of observations on $k$ binary dummy variables, and consider an arbitrary Bernoulli vector $u_0$ of length $k$. Then let $\delta(u_i, u_0) = (u_i - u_0)'(u_i - u_0)$, and define the discrete kernel function

$$G_1(u_i \mid u_0, \lambda_1) = \lambda_1^{-\delta(u_i, u_0)}(1 - \lambda_1)^{\delta(u_i, u_0)},$$

(3.9)

\(^{25}\)The fitted values in $\hat{\alpha}$ provide estimates of elements of the vector $\partial m(z_0)/\partial z$. However, if the object is to estimate first derivatives, mean-square error of the estimates can be reduced by locally fitting a quadratic rather than a linear expression (see Fan & Gijbels, 1996 for discussion); this increases computational costs, which are already substantial for the local linear fit. Moreover, determining the optimal bandwidths becomes more difficult and computationally more burdensome for estimation of derivatives. See Härdle (1990, pp. 160–162) for discussion of some of the issues that are involved with bandwidth selection for derivative estimation.

\(^{26}\)Aitchison & Aitken (1976) discuss the use of a discrete kernel for discrimination analysis. Bierens (1987) and Delgado & Mora (1995) suggest augmenting the Nadarya-Watson estimator with a discrete kernel, and prove that the estimator remains consistent and asymptotically normal. Racine & Li (2000) establish convergence rates for the Nadarya-Watson estimator with mixed continuous-discrete data; the rate with continuous and discrete covariates is the same as the rate with the same number of continuous variables, but no discrete variables. Thus, introduction of discrete covariates does not exacerbate the curse of dimensionality, at least in the limit.
where \( h_1 \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1] \) is a bandwidth parameter.

Note that \( \lim_{h_1 \to 1} G_1(u_i \mid u_0, h_1) \) equals 1 or 0, depending on whether \( u_0 = u_i \) or \( u_0 \neq u_i \), respectively. If \( h_1 = 1 \), the procedure is equivalent to splitting the sample into the four sub-groups suggested by the dummy variables and estimating independently on each of four subsamples. Alternatively, if \( h_1 = \frac{1}{2} \), then \( G_1(u_i \mid u_0, h_1) = 1 \) regardless of whether \( u_0 = u_i \) or \( u_0 \neq u_i \); in this case, there is complete smoothing over the four sub-groups, and including the dummy variables has no effect on the estimation.

Next, consider the ordered, categorical variable \( T_i \) which takes values in the set \( T = \{1, 2, \ldots, T_{\text{max}}\} \), and let \( T_0 \in T \). Define a kernel function
\[
G_2(T_i \mid T_0, h_2) = h_2^{|T_i - T_0|}
\] (3.10)
where \( h_2 \in [0, 1] \) is a third bandwidth parameter. For \( h_2 < 1 \), as the difference \( |T_i - T_0| \) increases, \( G_2(T_i \mid T_0, h_2) \) becomes smaller. In other words, for \( h_2 < 1 \), observations from time periods farther from \( T_0 \) receive less weight than observations from time periods that are closer to \( T_0 \).

We specify the kernel function \( K(\cdot) \) as an \( \ell \)-variate spherically symmetric Epanechnikov kernel, i.e.,
\[
K(u) = \frac{\ell(\ell + 2)}{2S_\ell} (1 - uu') I(uu' \leq 1)
\] (3.11)
where \( I(\cdot) \) is the indicator function, \( S_\ell = 2\pi^{\ell/2}/\Gamma(\ell/2) \), \( \Gamma(\cdot) \) denotes the gamma function, \( u = |H|^{-\ell}(z_i - z_0) \), and \( H \) is an \( (\ell \times \ell) \) matrix of bandwidths. The spherically symmetric Epanechnikov kernel is optimal in terms of asymptotic minimax risk; see Fan et al. (1997) for details and a proof.

Incorporating the discrete covariates, an estimate \( \hat{m}(z_0, T_0, D_{01}, D_{02}) \) of the conditional mean function in (3.4) at an arbitrary point \( (z_0, T_0, D_{01}, D_{02}) \in \mathbb{R}^\ell \times T \times \{0, 1\}^2 \) is given by \( \hat{\alpha}_0 \) obtained from
\[
[\hat{\alpha}_0, \hat{\alpha}]' = \arg\min_{\alpha_0, \alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{n} |C_i - \alpha_0 - (z_i - z_0)\alpha|^2 K(|H|^{-1}(z_i - z_0))
\]
\[
G_1(w_i \mid w_0, \lambda_1)G_2(T_i \mid T_0, \lambda_2),
\] (3.12)
where \( T_0 \in \{1, 2, \ldots, 18\} \) and \( w_0 \) is a \( (2 \times 1) \) Bernoulli vector. The solution to the least-squares problem in (3.12) is given by
\[
[\hat{\alpha}_0, \hat{\alpha}]' = (Z'\Omega X)^{-1} Z\Omega C
\] (3.13)
where $Z$ is defined as in (3.8) and the weighting matrix is given by

$$
\Omega = \text{diag} \left[ K(h(z_0)^{-\ell}(z_i - z_0))G_1(w_i \mid w_0, \lambda_1)G_2(T_i \mid T_0, \lambda_2) \right].
$$

(3.14)

Here, the determinant of the bandwidth matrix $H$ has been replaced by an adaptive bandwidth $h(z_0)$ raised to the $\ell$th power; since the principal components transformation pre-whitens the data, and since the principal components are orthogonal, we use the same bandwidth in each direction, with off-diagonal elements of $H$ equal to zero.

### 3.5 Bandwidth Selection and Inference

To implement our estimator, we must choose values for the bandwidths $h(z_0)$, $h_1$, and $h_2$. For the discrete data, we employ (globally) constant bandwidths, while for the continuous data we use an adaptive, nearest-neighbor bandwidth. We define $h(z_0)$ for any particular point $z_0 \in \mathbb{R}^\ell$ as the maximum Euclidean distance between $z_0$ and the $\kappa$ nearest points in the observed sample $\{z_i\}_{i=1}^n$, $\kappa \in \{2, 3, 4, \ldots\}$. Thus, given the data and the point $z_0$, the bandwidth $h(z_0)$ is determined by $\kappa$, and varies depending on the density of the continuous explanatory variables locally around the point $z_0 \in \mathbb{R}^\ell$ at which the conditional mean function is estimated. This results in a relatively large value for $h(z_0)$ where the data are sparse (and where more smoothing is required), and smaller values of $h(z_0)$ in regions where the data are relatively dense (where less smoothing is needed). The discrete kernels in (3.14) in turn give more (or less) weight to observations among the $\kappa$ nearest neighbors that are close (or far) away along the time dimension, or that are in the same (or different) category determined by the combination of binary dummy variables.

Note that we use a nearest-neighbor bandwidth, not a nearest-neighbor estimator. We use the bandwidth inside a kernel function, and the kernel function integrates to unity. Loftsgaarden & Quesenberry (1965) use this approach in the density estimation context to avoid nearest-neighbor density estimates (as opposed to bandwidths) that do not integrate to unity.\footnote{See Pagan & Ullah, 1999, pp. 11-12 for additional discussion. Fan & Gijbels (1994; 1996, pp. 151–152) discuss nearest neighbor bandwidths in the regression context.}

As a practical matter, we set $\kappa = [h_0n]$, where $h_0 \in (0, 1)$, $n$ represents the sample size, and $[a]$ denotes the integer part of $a$. We optimize the choice of values for the bandwidth
parameters by minimizing the least-squares cross-validation function; i.e., we select values
\[ \left[ \hat{h}_0 \; \hat{h}_1 \; \hat{h}_2 \right] = \arg \min_{h_0,h_1,h_2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} [C_i - \hat{m}_{-i}(z_i, T_i, D_{i1}, D_{i2})]^2, \tag{3.15} \]
where \( \hat{m}_{-i}(z_i, T_i, D_{i1}, D_{i2}) \) is computed the same way as \( \hat{m}(z_i, T_i, D_{i1}, D_{i2}) \), except that the \( i \)th diagonal element of \( \Psi \) is replaced with zero. The least-squares cross validation function approximates the part of mean integrated square error that depends on the bandwidths.\(^{28}\)

Once we have selected appropriate values of the bandwidth parameters, we can estimate the conditional mean function at any point \((z_0, T_0, D_{01}, D_{02}) \in \mathbb{R}^\ell \times T \times \{0, 1\}^k\). We then estimate the RSE and EPSE measures defined in (2.9) and (2.11) by replacing the cost terms with estimates obtained from the relation (3.5). We use the wild bootstrap proposed by Härdle (1990) and Härdle & Mammen (1993) to make inferences about RSE and EPSE. First, we obtain bootstrap estimates \( \hat{m}_b^*() \), which we then substitute into (2.9) and (2.11) to obtain bootstrap values \( \hat{S}_b^* \) and \( \hat{E}_b^* \) for particular values of \( z \) and \( D_1, D_2 \), with \( b = 1, \ldots, B \).\(^{29}\)

Next, we use the bias-correction method described by Efron & Tibshirani (1993) to make inference about \( S \). In particular, we estimate \( (1 - \alpha) \times 100\)-percent confidence intervals by \( \left( \hat{S}^{*(\alpha_1)}, \hat{S}^{*(\alpha_2)} \right) \), where \( \hat{S}^{*(\alpha)} \) denotes the \( \alpha \)-quantile of the bootstrap values \( \hat{S}_b^* \), \( b = 1, \ldots, B \), and
\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha_1 &= \Phi \left( \hat{\varphi}_0 + \frac{\hat{\varphi}_0 + \varphi^{(\alpha/2)}}{1 - \hat{\varphi}_0 + \varphi^{(\alpha/2)}} \right), \\
\alpha_2 &= \Phi \left( \hat{\varphi}_0 + \frac{\hat{\varphi}_0 + \varphi^{(1-\alpha/2)}}{1 - \hat{\varphi}_0 + \varphi^{(1-\alpha/2)}} \right),
\end{align*}
\tag{3.16, 3.17}
\]
\( \Phi(\cdot) \) denotes the standard normal distribution function, \( \varphi^{(\alpha)} \) is the \( (\alpha \times 100) \)-th percentile of the standard normal distribution, and
\[ \hat{\varphi}_0 = \Phi^{-1} \left( \frac{\#\{\hat{S}_b^* < \hat{S}\}}{B} \right), \tag{3.18} \]
with \( \Phi^{-1}(\cdot) \) denoting the standard normal quantile function (e.g., \( \Phi^{-1}(0.95) \approx 1.6449 \)).

For RSE, we sort the values in \( \left\{ (\hat{S}_b^* - \hat{S}) \right\}_{b=1}^{B} \) by algebraic value, delete \( (\frac{\alpha}{2} \times 100) \)-percent of the elements at either end of this sorted array, and denote the lower and upper

\(^{28}\)Choice of \( \kappa \) by cross validation has been proposed by Fan & Gijbels (1996) and has been used by Wheelock & Wilson (2001), Wilson & Carey (2004) and others.

\(^{29}\)Ordinary bootstrap methods are inconsistent in our context due to the asymptotic bias of the estimator; see Mammen (1992) for additional discussion.
endpoints of the remaining, sorted array as $-b^*_a$ and $-a^*_a$, respectively. Then a bootstrap estimate of a $(1 - \alpha)$-percent confidence interval for $S$ is

$$\hat{S} + a^*_a \leq S \leq \hat{S} + b^*_a.$$  

(3.19)

The idea underlying (3.19) is that the empirical distribution of the bootstrap values $(\hat{S}^*_b - \hat{S})$ mimics the unknown distribution of $(\hat{S} - S)$, with the approximation improving as $n \to \infty$. As $B \to \infty$, the choices of $-b^*_a$ and $-a^*_a$ become increasingly accurate estimates of the percentiles of the distribution of $(\hat{S}^*_b - \hat{S})$ (we set $B = 1000$). Any bias in $\hat{S}$ relative to $S$ is reflected in bias of $\hat{S}^*_b$ relative to $\hat{S}$. The estimated confidence interval may not contain the original estimate $\hat{S}$ if the bias is large because the estimated confidence interval corrects for the bias in $\hat{S}$. We estimate confidence intervals for the EPSE measures similarly.

4 Empirical Results

We estimated Models 1–4 and obtained similar results, both qualitatively and quantitatively, across the four specifications. As an additional robustness check, we also estimated the four different models with time $T$ treated as a continuous variable. This, too, made almost no difference in the results. Here, we report results for the models estimated with time treated as a discrete variable, with particular focus on results from Model 2 where the management variable $M$ described in Section 2.2 has been added to the baseline model (Model 1) described in Section 2.1. Results from estimation of the models with time treated as continuous are available from the authors on request.

As discussed above in Section 3.5, values for the three bandwidth parameters $h_0$, $h_1$, and $h_2$ are needed for estimation. Using the Nelder & Mead (1965) simplex algorithm with the credit-union data to optimize the least-squares cross-validation function in (3.15) yields $\hat{h}_0 = 0.004488$, $0.003365$, $0.004976$, and $0.004356$ for Model 1–4, respectively (corresponding to $\hat{\kappa} = 827$, $620$, $836$, and $732$). Similarly, we obtain values $\hat{h}_1 = 0.9409$, $0.9283$, $0.9427$, and $0.9458$, as well as $\hat{h}_2 = 0.4394$, $0.3889$, $0.4861$, and $0.4562$. The bandwidths can be expected to differ across the four models due to differences in numbers of observations (for Models 1–2, we have 184,279 observations, but for Models 3–4 we have only 168,055 observations due to the use of lagged variables), as well as the inclusion of $M$ in Models 2 and 4. Nonetheless, the variation in selected bandwidths across the four models appears rather small. Recalling
the discussion following (3.9) and (3.10), the data and selected bandwidths indicate that little smoothing should be used across the categories determined by the dummy variables $D_1$ and $D_2$, and that moderate smoothing should be done across time periods.

We used the selected bandwidth values to estimate the EPSE measure defined in (2.11) for each credit union represented in our data for 1989, 1997, and 2006 for each model. In addition, we estimated corresponding (95 percent) confidence intervals using the bias-corrected bootstrap described in Section 3.5. For each year, we divide credit unions into quartiles of total assets. Table 4 reports the median value of the EPSE estimates obtained from Models 1–2 across credit unions in each quartile-year. The table also reports the numbers of estimates that are significantly less than one (and hence indicating increasing returns to scale) in the column labeled “IRS”, insignificantly different from one (and hence failing to reject constant returns to scale) in the column labeled “CRS”, and significantly greater than one (indicative of decreasing returns to scale) in the column labeled “DRS”. The last column of Table 4 gives the number of observations in each quartile-year. Table 5 reports similar information obtained from estimation of Models 3–4.

The results are striking, and remarkably robust across the four specifications. The results indicate that nearly all credit unions in each quartile-year faced increasing returns to scale. For example, the results for Model 2 indicate that we reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale for all but one credit union in 1989, for all but two credit unions in 1997, and for all but 36 credit unions, or less than 0.5 percent of 8,039 operating credit unions, in 2006. Moreover, for each Model 1–4, we find no evidence that any credit unions faced decreasing returns to scale. These results suggest that further consolidation of the industry and increasing average size of individual credit unions are likely.

Figures 3–5 show estimated 95-percent confidence intervals for EPSE corresponding to each credit union in each quartile-year based on Model 2. The estimated confidence intervals are represented by vertical line segments; observations within each quartile-year have been sorted by the estimated upper bound.\(^{30}\) Although the number of line segments in each panel of Figures 3–5 is too large to permit viewing of individual line segments, the plots show the overall pattern. In particular, the figures reveal that in the few cases where constant returns

\(^{30}\)The results are very similar across all four models. The authors will provide figures based on results from Models 1 and 3–4 upon request.
to scale cannot be rejected, the estimated confidence intervals are considerably wider than in most cases where constant returns is rejected. In addition, the upper bounds in the first quartile for each year are typically smaller in magnitude than the upper bounds in the largest quartile. Apparently, while returns to scale are increasing throughout the range of credit union sizes, smaller credit unions face greater potential gains than larger credit unions, as one might expect. Finally, comparing the second and third quartiles across years, it is evident that credit unions in the middle of the size distribution in each year have, over time, moved slightly closer to constant returns; i.e., in the panels labeled “Quartile 2” and “Quartile 3,” the estimated confidence intervals in 1997 have shifted upward relative to 1989, and those in 2006 have shifted upward still farther. This result is consistent with the shift over time of the density of (log) total assets shown in Figure 1.

We also estimated the RSE measure defined in (2.9) for \( \theta \in \{0.05, 0.10, 0.15, \ldots, 0.95, 1.0, 2.0, \ldots, 25.0\} \), with \((y_0, w_0)\) given by the medians of each variable, setting \( T \) equal to 1, 9, or 18 (corresponding to the first, middle, and last years of our observation period, i.e., 1989, 1997, and 2006). We chose this range of values for \( \theta \) after noting that total assets in our sample range from about 0.05 times median assets to about 25 times median assets.

Results for estimation of RSE using Model 2 are illustrated in Figure 6, which contains a \((3 \times 4)\) matrix of plots of our RSE measure as a function of \( \theta \). The four columns in Figure 6 correspond to the four combinations of values for the dummy variables \( D_1 \) and \( D_2 \). The three rows in the figure correspond to 1989, 1997, and 2006. In each plot, we use a log-scale for \( \theta \) on the horizontal axis, and connect the plotted points with solid lines. In addition, we used the bias-corrected bootstrap describe above in Section 3.5 to estimate 95-percent confidence intervals corresponding to each estimate of \( S(\theta \mid y_0, w_0) \); upper and lower bounds are indicated by the dashed curves in Figure 6.

\(^{31}\) Again, the results are very similar across all four models. The authors will provide figures based on the results from Models 1 and 3-4 upon request.

\(^{32}\) Note that in each panel of Figure 6, estimates of \( S(\theta \mid y_0, w_0) \) (indicated by the solid curve) for the smallest and the largest values of \( \theta \) lie outside corresponding estimated 95-percent confidence intervals (indicated by the dashed curves). This reflects the fact that the local-polynomial estimator used to estimate the cost function in (3.4) is only weakly consistent, and asymptotically biased. In addition, estimates of cost \( \hat{C}(y, w) \) obtained from (3.5) involve a non-linear transformation of fitted values from estimates \( \hat{C} \) of the dependent variable in (3.4). Furthermore, estimation of the RSE measure in (2.9) involve further non-linear transformations of estimates \( \hat{C} \). Thus, even if the local-polynomial regression estimator yielded unbiased estimates, estimates of the RSE measure would be biased. As discussed above in Section 3.5, our bootstrap method involves a bias correction and hence estimates of \( S(\theta \mid y_0, w_0) \) sometimes lie outside the
Recalling the discussion in Section 2, downward slopes for the RSE measure as a function of $\theta$ indicate increasing returns to scale along the ray from the origin through the medians of the continuous variables. The results illustrated in Figure 6 indicate sharply increasing returns to scale up to about the median-size credit union (corresponding to $\theta = 1$). Beyond the median size, the RTS measure yields little evidence of increasing returns, in contrast to evidence obtained from estimation of the EPSE measure discussed above. RSE measures returns to scale along a single path through the medians of the continuous covariates, however, whereas EPSE captures returns to scale along the observed expansion paths for each credit union. To the extent that there are non-linear relationships among the right-hand side continuous variables, the ray from the origin through the medians is likely to lie far from where most credit unions actually operate; i.e., there may be no observations near this ray. Moreover, given the nature of our estimator and our use of adaptive bandwidths, much more smoothing is required in regions where data are sparse, which tends to flatten estimates of the conditional mean function in (3.5). This would tend to make rejection of constant returns to scale less likely for larger credit unions because the size distribution of credit unions is skewed to the right, as shown in Figure 1. Hence, the EPSE measure seems more relevant, especially for larger credit unions, than the RSE measure.

5 Conclusions

Credit unions hold a small, but growing share of total U.S. depository institution assets. Moreover, like commercial banks, the average size of credit unions has increased sharply during the past two decades, suggesting that changes in regulation and technology have favored larger credit unions over their smaller competitors. Researchers have found evidence of expanding returns to scale for commercial banks, and that large banks have experienced larger increases in productivity than small banks. However, we are unaware of studies investigating returns to scale rigorously for credit unions.

This paper uses a non-parametric local-linear estimator to estimate a model of credit union costs, from which we derive estimates of returns to scale. As other studies have found using data on commercial banks and other types of firms, we test and reject as a corresponding estimated confidence intervals.
misspecification even a comparatively flexible translog cost function for credit unions. Our non-parametric estimator avoids the difficulty of specifying and estimating a parametric cost function such as a translog function. Further, we employ a dimension-reduction technique to reduce estimation error that can arise when non-parametric estimators are used to estimate high-dimension models.

We use annual data on all U.S. retail credit unions (except those with missing or implausible data) for 1989-2006 to estimate both ray-scale and expansion-path scale economies. Although most studies focus on ray-scale economies, we also examine expansion-path scale economies to better estimate scale economies near the combinations of inputs and outputs that reflect actual credit union production. We find that throughout the sample period, the vast majority of credit unions—almost all—operated under increasing returns to scale, as reflected in our estimates along observed expansion paths. Thus, despite considerable industry consolidation and growth in average credit union size, it appears that as recently as 2006 most credit unions were too small to fully exploit possible scale economies. Competitive pressures both among credit unions and from other types of depository institutions are thus likely to encourage further growth in the average size of U.S. credit unions, as would further relaxation of legal restrictions on credit union membership or permissible activities.

A Appendix

In order to test a translog specification for the credit union cost function, for each year 1989, . . . , 2006 represented in our sample we computed median total assets and created two subsamples of observations. In subsample 1 we include all observations for a particular year where total assets are less than or equal to median assets for that year, while in subsample 2 we include all observations for the given year where total assets are greater than median assets for that year. Next, we use each subset to estimate the translog cost function.
corresponding to Model \( m, m \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \). For Model 1, the translog specification is

\[
\log(C/W_2) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \log(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3) + \beta_3 \log(1 + Y_4) + \beta_4 \log Y_5 + \beta_5 \log Y_6
\]

\[
+ \beta_6 \log(W_1/W_2) + \beta_7 D_1 + \beta_8 D_2 + \beta_9 \log(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3) \log(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3)
\]

\[
+ \beta_{10} \log(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3) \log(1 + Y_4) + \beta_{11} \log(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3) \log Y_5
\]

\[
+ \beta_{12} \log(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3) \log Y_6 + \beta_{13} \log(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3) \log(W_1/W_2)
\]

\[
+ \beta_{14} \log(1 + Y_4) \log(1 + Y_4) + \beta_{15} \log(1 + Y_4) \log Y_5 + \beta_{16} \log(1 + Y_4) \log Y_6
\]

\[
+ \beta_{17} \log(1 + Y_4) \log(W_1/W_2) + \beta_{18} \log Y_5 \log Y_5 + \beta_{19} \log Y_5 \log Y_6
\]

\[
+ \beta_{20} \log Y_5 \log(W_1/W_2) + \beta_{21} \log Y_6 \log Y_6 + \beta_{22} \log Y_6 \log(W_1/W_2)
\]

\[
+ \beta_{23} \log(W_1/W_2) \log(W_1/W_2) + \beta_{24} D_1 \log(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3) + \beta_{25} D_1 \log(1 + Y_4)
\]

\[
+ \beta_{26} D_1 \log Y_5 + \beta_{27} D_1 \log Y_6 + \beta_{28} D_1 \log(W_1/W_2) + \beta_{29} D_2 \log(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3)
\]

\[
+ \beta_{30} D_2 \log(1 + Y_4) + \beta_{31} D_2 \log Y_5 + \beta_{32} D_2 \log Y_6 + \beta_{33} D_2 \log(W_1/W_2)
\]

\[
+ \varepsilon,
\]

(A.1)

\( E(\varepsilon) = 0 \). Note that dividing cost \( C \) and the price of capital \( W_1 \) by the price of labor \( W_2 \) ensures homogeneity with respect to input prices. In addition, it is necessary to add a constant to \( Y_4 \) due to a small number of observations with zero values for this variable. Our treatment of \( Y_1, Y_2, \) and \( Y_3 \) is similar to that in our non-parametric estimation, and avoids taking logs of zero, due to the large number of observed zero-values for \( Y_2 \) and \( Y_3 \).

For Model 2, additional terms

\[
\beta_{34} \log(1 + M) + \beta_{35} \log(1 + M) \log(Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3) + \beta_{36} \log(1 + M) \log(1 + Y_4) +
\]

\[
\beta_{37} \log(1 + M) \log(Y_5) + \beta_{38} \log(1 + M) \log(Y_6) + \beta_{39} \log(1 + M) \log(W_1/W_2) +
\]

\[
\beta_{40} \log(1 + M) \log(1 + M) + \beta_{41} D_1 \log(1 + M) + \beta_{42} D_2 \log(1 + M)
\]

are added to the right-hand side of (A.1). For Models 3 and 4, \( Y_1, Y_2, Y_3, \) and \( Y_4 \) are replaced by their lagged counterparts. The number of parameters \( K_j \) in Model \( j \) is 33 for \( j \in \{1, 3\} \) and 42 for \( j \in \{2, 4\} \).

For subsample \( \ell \) containing \( n_\ell \) observations in Model \( m \) and a given year, \( \ell \in \{1, 2\} \), let \( \beta_{m\ell} = [\beta_1 \ldots \beta_{K_j}]' \), and let \( X_{m\ell} \) be the \( (n_{m\ell} \times K_j) \) matrix containing the right-hand side variables in (A.1); the first column of \( X_{m\ell} \) consists of a vector of 1’s. In addition, let \( Y_{m\ell} \)
represent the \((n_{m\ell} \times 1)\) matrix containing the \(n_{m\ell}\) observations on the left-hand side variable in (A.1), so that the model can be written (for Model \(j\) and sub-sample \(\ell\) in a given year) as

\[
Y_{m\ell} = X_{m\ell} \beta_{m\ell} + \varepsilon_{m\ell}, \tag{A.2}
\]

where \(\varepsilon_{m\ell}\) is an \((n_{m\ell} \times 1)\) matrix of disturbances with zero mean.

Using data for each subsample \(\ell = 1, 2\) in Model \(j\) for a given year, we estimate (A.1) using ordinary least squares (OLS), yielding \(\hat{\beta}_{m\ell}\) and \(\hat{\varepsilon}_{m\ell} = Y_{m\ell} - X_{m\ell} \hat{\beta}_{m\ell}\). Next, we compute White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator

\[
\hat{\Sigma}_{m\ell} = (X'_{m\ell} X_{m\ell})^{-1}(X'_{m\ell} E_{m\ell} X_{m\ell})(X'_{m\ell} X_{m\ell})^{-1}, \tag{A.3}
\]

for each subsample, where \(E_{m\ell}\) is the \((n_{m\ell} \times n_{m\ell})\) diagonal matrix with elements of \(\hat{\varepsilon}_{m\ell}\) along the principal diagonal. Under the null hypothesis \(H_0 : \beta_{m1} = \beta_{m2}\), asymptotic normality of OLS estimators ensures that the Wald statistic

\[
\hat{W} = (\hat{\beta}_{m1} - \hat{\beta}_{m2})' \left( \hat{\Sigma}_{m1} + \hat{\Sigma}_{m2} \right)^{-1} (\hat{\beta}_{m1} - \hat{\beta}_{m2}) \xrightarrow{d} \chi^2(K_j). \tag{A.4}
\]

We computed the Wald statistic in (A.4) for Models 1–2 for each of the 18 years represented in our sample, and for Models 3–4 for all but the first year (due to the lagged variables in Models 3–4). Over the 70 different tests, we obtained values of the Wald statistic ranging from 530.95 to 4688.52; the largest \(p\)-value among the 70 different tests was \(2.024 \times 10^{-61}\). Hence, the translog specification in (A.1) is rejected at any reasonable level of significance, for each model we considered and for each year represented in our sample.
References


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— (2007), Consolidation in the U.S. credit union sector: Determinants of failure and acquisition. Unpublished working paper, Bangor Business School, University of Wales, Bangor, United Kingdom.


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Table 1: Variable Definitions

\( Y_1 \) — Real estate loans: amount of first mortgage real estate loans (CUSA0243) + amount of other real estate loans (CUSA0244).

\( Y_2 \) — Commercial loans: for years 1989–2003, amount of commercial loans (CUSA0257) + amount of agricultural loans to members (CUSA1235); for years 2004–2006, member business loans, total amount outstanding (CUSA4899).

\( Y_3 \) — Consumer loans: total loans and leases, amount (CUSA1263) \( - (Y_1 + Y_2) \).

\( Y_4 \) — Investments: for years 1989–2005, total investments (less derivatives contracts) (CUSA4577); for year 2006, balances due from U.S. depository institutions (CUSA0082) + investments eligible for liquidity (CUSA0851) + membership capital at corporate credit unions (CUSAB158) + deposits in commercial banks, S&Ls, savings banks (total amount) (CUSA8632) + paid in capital at corporate credit unions (CUSAB148) + all other investments in corporate credit unions (CUSA1110) + U.S. Treasury securities—book value (excluding trading accounts) (CUSA0400) + U.S. Government agency and corporation obligations—book value (excluding trading accounts) (CUSA0600) + mutual funds (CUSA8628) + shares, deposits, and certificates in other credit unions, total amount (CUSA1116).

\( Y_5 \) — Savings pricing: \((\text{dividends on shares (CUSA4278) + interest on deposits (CUSA4279)})/\text{total shares and deposits (CUSA2197)}\).

\( Y_6 \) — Loan pricing: interest and fee income on loans, total (CUSA4010 / amount of total loans and leases (CUSA1263)).

\( W_1 \) — Price of capital: capital expenses, i.e. gross occupancy expense (CUSA4210) + office operations expense (CUSA4209) + advertising expense (CUSA4143) + travel and conference expense (CUSA4207) + loan expenses (CUSA4152) + operating expenses fees, professional and outside services (CUSA4211) + other operating expenses (CUSA4240) + miscellaneous operating expenses (CUSA4526), divided by total shares and deposits (CUSA2197).

\( W_2 \) — Price of labor: labor expenses, i.e. officers and employee compensation (CUSA4137), divided by number of full-time credit union employees (CUSA6047) + (1/2 times) number of part-time credit union employees (CUSA6048).

\( M \) — Technical efficiency estimated using (2.7); see Section 2.2 for details.


\( D_1 \) — Dummy variable: equals 1 if \( Y_1 > 0 \); 0 otherwise.

\( D_2 \) — Dummy variable: equals 1 if \( Y_2 > 0 \); 0 otherwise.

\( C \) — Variable cost: capital expenses + labor expenses.
Table 2: Summary Statistics, 1989–2006

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<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Q1</th>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Q3</th>
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NOTE: COST, Y_1, Y_2, Y_3, Y_4, and ASSETS are measured in thousands of (year 2000) dollars; Y_5, Y_6, and W_1 are dimensionless ratios, and W_2 is measured in thousands of (year 2000) dollars per full-time equivalent employees. Columns labelled “Q1” and “Q3” give first and third quartiles for each variable, while the last column (labelled “#0s”) gives the number of observations where each variable equals zero.
Table 3: Number of Observations per Year

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Table 5: Expansion-Path Scale Economies (Discrete Time, Models 3–4)

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Figure 1: Density of Total (Log) Assets

Note: Kernel estimates of the density of (log) total assets for 1989, 1997, and 2006 are shown by the dotted, dashed, and solid curves, respectively. Total assets are measured in thousands of constant year 2000 dollars.
Figure 2: RSE and EPSE Measures
Figure 3: Expansion Path Scale Economies by Asset Size Quartile, Discrete Time, Model 2 (1989)
Figure 4: Expansion Path Scale Economies by Asset Size Quartile, Discrete Time, Model 2 (1997)
Figure 5: Expansion Path Scale Economies by Asset Size Quartile, Discrete Time, Model 2 (2006)
Figure 6: Ray Scale Economies (Model 2)

\[ Y_1 = 0, \ Y_2 = 0 \] \hspace{2cm} \[ Y_1 = 0, \ Y_2 > 0 \] \hspace{2cm} \[ Y_1 > 0, \ Y_2 = 0 \] \hspace{2cm} \[ Y_1 > 0, \ Y_2 > 0 \]